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ABSTRACT 
 
AN INTERGENERATIONAL OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE DEFICIT REDUCTION STRATEGIES FOR THE PENSION 
SYSTEM IN TURKEY  
 
Çiftçi, B. Barış 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Serdar Sayan 
 
September 2002 
 
The publicly managed pension system in Turkey is currently run by the pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) scheme, using contributions out of wage/salary incomes of currently 
active workers to finance pension benefits to retirees. The expenditure-revenue balances 
of a PAYG-based scheme are determined by the existing configuration of system 
parameters: the contribution rate which defines the rate at which a worker’s 
payroll/wage is contributed to the pension scheme; the replacement rate which defines 
the rate at which average income earned during the working phase of life cycle is 
replaced by the pension income, and the entitlement age which controls the relative sizes 
of workers and retirees covered. After the system began to generate huge losses starting 
from the first half of the 1990s, the government was forced to introduce a parametric 
reform act in 1999 so as to curb pension deficits by adjusting the values of pension 
parameters. 
This thesis considers SSK, the largest pension fund in Turkey, and develops a 
numerical optimization framework in order to identify the configurations of pension 
parameters that i) will minimize the deterioration in the economic well-beings of the 
generations that will face reform parameters, relative to the economic well-being of 
generations that faced/will continue to face the pre-reform parameters and ii) maintain, 
at the same time, the actuarial balance of the system over 1995-2060 period. The results 
indicate that even the optimal configurations imply a radical deterioration in the level of 
economic well-being of the generations that will face reform parameters relative to the 
level implied by the pre-reform configuration.  
  
Keywords: Social security and public pensions, retirement policy, optimization 
techniques, programming models and dynamic analysis. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK EMEKLİLİK SİSTEMİ AÇIĞINI AZALTMA STRATEJİLERİNİN 
NESİLLERARASI EN İYİLEŞTİRME ANALİZİ 
 
 
Çiftçi, B. Barış 
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr.  Serdar Sayan 
 
Eylül 2002 
 
  Türkiye’nin devlet kontrolündeki sosyal güvenlik sistemi dağıtım esasına dayalı 
olarak çalışmaktadır. Dağıtım esasına göre çalışan sigorta sistemlerinde, aktif çalışanlar 
ve onların işverenlerince yapılan katkılar daha önce aynı katkıyı yapmış olan emeklilere 
yapılan ödemelerin finansmanında kullanılır.  Sisteme yapılacak katkı çalışanın prime 
esas kazancının uygun prim oranı ile çarpılmasıyla, yaşlılık aylığı olarak bağlanacak 
miktar ise sigortalılık yaşamı boyunca elde edilen prime esas kazanç ve aylık bağlama 
oranına dayanan bir sistemle belirlenir. Prim ödeyen çalışan başına düşen emekli sayısı 
yasa koyucu tarafından belirlenen emekli olma yaşı ile kontrol edilir. 1990’ların ilk 
yarısından itibaren sürekli ve hızlı bir şekilde büyüyen sosyal sigortalar sistemi açığı, 
mevcut hükümeti 1999 yılında bir parametrik emeklilik sistemi reformu gerçekleştirmek 
zorunda bırakmıştır. 
Biz bu çalışmamızda parametrik emeklilik sistemi reform alternatiflerinden, hem 
bozulan gelir gider dengesini seçilen zaman dilimi içerisinde onaran, hem de reform 
yasasına yani yeni reform parametrelerine tabi olan nesillerle, reform öncesi 
parametrelere tabi olan nesiller arasında sistemden alınan fayda açısından en adil olan 
konfigürasyonları belirlemeye çalıştık. Bu amaçla geliştirdiğimiz matematiksel modeli 
kullanarak SSK’nın 1995-2060 yılları arasında vereceği açığı en aza indirgeyen reform 
konfigürasyonlarından, reformun yükünün nesiller  üzerine en adil dağılımını 
gerçekleştirenleri  belirledik. Sonuçta, en adil parametre konfigürasyonlarının bile 
reform parametrelerine tabi olacak nesillerin sistemden elde edeceği ekonomik faydada, 
reform öncesi parametrelere tabi nesillerin sistemden elde ettikleri faydaya oranla büyük 
bir  azalmaya neden olacağını belirledik.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal güvenlik ve devlet kontrolündeki emeklilik sistemleri, 
emeklilik  politikaları, en iyileştirme teknikleri, programlama modelleri ve dinamik 
analiz. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Due to declining birth rates and improvements in longevity, the proportion of 
older people in the population is gradually increasing in many countries. As a result of 
this population aging, the share of public spending on retirement and health-care benefits 
for elderly in the national incomes is growing rapidly, and is threatening the financial 
sustainability of these public programs. Financial difficulties currently faced by these 
programs force policy makers to make adjustments by increasing the payroll taxes, 
and/or decreasing the retirement and health-care benefits. Naturally, these policies have 
different implications for the distribution of the burden of the policy reform among 
different generations. Considering the increasing political strength of the elderly due to 
population aging and the myopic behavior of governments that are concerned with short-
term electoral outcomes, policy reforms introduced to fight growing pension/health-care 
deficits typically favor older generations, while aggravating the situation for the younger 
and the future generations. This observation has provoked considerable public concern 
on the relative economic well-beings of the old, the young and the future generations. 
Publicly managed pension systems operating on the basis of pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) principle are at the center of these discussions. These pension schemes use 
contributions of currently active workers to finance pension benefits to eligible retirees, 
who have previously contributed to the system and are controlled by three parameters: 
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the contribution rate which defines the rate at which a worker’s payroll/wage is 
contributed to the pension scheme; the replacement rate which defines the rate at which 
average income earned during the working phase of life cycle is replaced by the pension 
income, and the entitlement age which controls the relative sizes of workers and retirees 
covered. Thus, when the fiscal sustainability of such schemes are threatened by 
economic and/or demographic events, the policy makers must adjust these three 
parameters within politically acceptable limits in order to maintain the long-term 
actuarial balances of the scheme. However, as indicated by Sayan and Kiracı (2001a), it 
is possible to find infinitely many configurations of these three parameters, which can 
repair the actuarial balance of the system in the desired period of time. Naturally, each of 
these configurations will imply different levels of economic well-beings relevant to the 
pension scheme for the generations that will face these configurations, i.e., the 
generations that will bear the burden of reform.  
In this study, we are concerned with the balance between financial sustainability 
of a PAYG-based pension system and the relative economic well-beings of generations 
in a parametric pension system reform. Specifically, this study aims to identify the 
configurations of three system parameters that i) will minimize the deterioration in the 
economic well-being of the generations to face the reform configuration as compared to 
the economic well-being of the generations facing the pre-reform configuration and ii) 
maintain, at the same time, the actuarial balance of the system over a pre-determined 
period. A simple optimization model is developed for this purpose. The economic well-
being of a generation under a pension reform policy is measured with the return that an 
active worker receives on his/her contributions to the scheme and the objective function 
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of the optimization problem is defined so as to minimize the difference between 
economic well-beings of generations facing pre-reform and post-reform parameters. 
This optimization problem is then solved for the case of SSK, the largest pension fund in 
Turkey, in order to determine the pension reform alternatives before the country. Then, 
the study utilizes the same optimization framework to identify the possible pension 
system reform parameters for different levels of compliance in order to determine the 
burden that the compliance problem places on both the employees and the employers 
who contribute to the system regularly in Turkey. Turkey is an interesting case in the 
parametric pension system reform literature, because the country currently has a younger 
population/workforce than the other countries where the financial sustainability of the 
pension schemes is threatened largely by population aging. The main reason behind the 
financial crisis of the PAYG-based pension system in Turkey is the exceptionally low 
minimum retirement ages by international standards, leading, in turn, to shorter 
contribution (longer retirement) periods than what is compatible with a financially self-
sufficient system. 
A general discussion of the relevant literature is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 
first describes the basic conceptual framework of the study, including the generational 
stance of a parametric pension system reform and its measurement. It then lays out the 
optimization approach and discusses its implementation. The chapter also discusses 
results and their implications, and compares the optimal configurations found to the 
parameters introduced through the 1999 Pension Reform enacted in Turkey. Chapter 4 
considers the compliance problem in Turkish pension system and its effects on both 
employees and employers who contribute to the system regularly, after discussing the 
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modification of the optimization framework to capture the effects of different levels of 
compliance. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
This chapter reviews the related literature starting with a brief survey of the 
studies that discuss the demographic and economic events leading to financial crises in 
PAYG-based pension schemes in Section 2.1. Relevant examples of pension reform 
literature that link up with the approach of this study are also provided in this section. 
Then, considering that each pension reform has to go through a political process, a 
survey of the studies that analyze the political and economic forces behind the 
establishment and the evolution of PAYG-based pension schemes is given in Section 
2.2. These political economy studies are interesting as they offer clues to explain the 
policy makers’ concerns about the distribution of the burden of reform between the 
elderly, the young and the future generations. This study also makes use of generational 
policy studies –the studies that analyze government’s relative treatment of different 
generations in a nation’s fiscal affairs– in explaining the concept of intergenerational 
equity, and utilizes generational accounting which is an alternative way of measuring 
fiscal policy performance. Hence, Section 2.3 provides a brief overview of generational 
policy studies, and surveys studies that employ the generational accounting framework.  
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2.1 Pay-As-You-Go Based Pension Systems and Identification of 
Possible Pension Sytem Parameters for Parametric Pension System 
Reforms 
“Pension systems are a means of transferring purchasing power from working 
phase to the retirement phase of the life cycle” (Algoed and Spinnewyn, 1999: 311). The 
answer to the question of who will finance the transferring of purchasing power defines 
the two main kinds1 of pension schemes: Funded schemes and PAYG-based schemes. In 
funded pension schemes, agents save to accumulate a fund in the working phase of their 
life cycle, and future pension payments to the survivors are made out of this fund. In 
PAYG-based pension schemes, pension payments to the retirees are financed by the 
contributions of working population.    
Marchand and Pestiau (1991) stress that the distinguishing feature of the PAYG-
based pension schemes is the redistribution of income between generations that is 
missing from the funded schemes. Considering that the overwhelming majority (98%) of 
all pension programs around the world have PAYG features (Mulligan and Sala-i 
Martin, 1999), most social security programs around the world entail intergenerational 
redistribution. 
Marchand and Pestiau (1991), OECD (1995 and 2000), Gruber and Wise (1997) 
and Legros (1997) emphasize that most industrialized countries are experiencing an 
aging process that is characterized by declining fertility rates and increasing life 
expectancy. They argue that this aging process threatens the sustainability of current 
                                                 
1 Besides the choice of financing method, there are also other design features of pension schemes. For 
example, pension schemes can be publicly or privately managed, membership may be mandatory or 
voluntary; some stress the insurance aspect while some others aim to provide adequate retirement incomes 
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levels of spending on the public pension schemes in the absence of drastic corrections in 
program parameters. They also state that the reforms which aim to repair the actuarial 
balances of these public programs are among the top items in the policy agenda of most 
industrialized countries. 
Chand and Jaeger (1996) argued that considerable additional fiscal stress is likely 
to emerge under a PAYG-based system, because population aging eventually requires 
that an increasing number of retirees be financed by a decreasing number of workers for 
an extended period of time.  Furthermore, they observed that there have been four ways 
in the literature suggested to ameliorate fiscal stresses from PAYG-based public pension 
systems: 
1) Through adjustments in the parameters defining a PAYG-based pension 
scheme to repair the actuarial balance of the system and to build up financial 
reserves.  The authors called this way of repairing actuarial balance of the 
system  “Parametric Pension System Reform.” 
2) Through systemic reforms such as moving towards funded schemes. 
3) By undertaking broader fiscal adjustments such as raising taxes and cutting 
expenditures not related to public pensions.  
4) Through modification of the profile of the society such as changing the size 
of the labor force by encouraging greater labor force participation or 
immigration policies.  
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As this study is concerned with the intergenerational aspects of the distribution 
of burden of parametric pension system reform of 1999 in Turkey, the literature survey 
in this section will focus on studies concerned with the parametric pension system 
reform as described in (1) above. 
Sayan and Kiracı (2001a) emphasized that infinitely many configurations of the 
three parameters that define a PAYG-based pension scheme can be found to repair the 
actuarial balance of the system in the desired period of time. So, the identification of 
possible configurations for a parametric pension system reform and their possible effects 
must be of highest concern: 
When a growing pension deficit signals the need for parametric pension 
reform, existing values of pension parameters must be changed within politically 
acceptable limits so as to eliminate (or to curb the growth in) pension deficits. 
Theoretically, however, there are infinitely many configurations of these three 
parameters that are compatible with the maintenance over time of a selected balance 
between contribution receipts and pension expenditures, and informing policy makers of 
the choices available to them requires identification of possible configurations. (Sayan 
and Kiracı, 2001a : 90) 
Sayan and Kiracı (2001a) analyzed the 1999 parametric pension system reform 
enacted in Turkey in this manner. In order to identify the possible parametric pension 
reform options before Turkey, they developed an optimization model in an intertemporal 
setting as in generational accounting studies.  They have found all possible 
configurations minimizing the intertemporal pension deficit in Turkey between 1995 and 
2060, and concluded that the minimum retirement age must be increased significantly, if 
the contribution and replacement rates are to remain around their current values.   
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Sayan and Kiracı (2001b) have extended their previous study aiming to identify 
possible parametric pension reform parameter configurations in such a way to allow for 
gradual increases in statutory retirement ages rather than one time jumps as in Sayan and 
Kiraci (2001a). In motivating this study as an extension of their previous work (2001a), 
the authors stated that the reform configurations calling for higher retirement ages were 
sure to cause discontent among workers who plan to retire soon, and hence, not 
politically feasible. In fact, many OECD countries have chosen to enact pension reforms 
with gradual increases in retirement ages so as to avoid the political turmoil a one time 
jump in retirement ages might cause (Kohl and O’Brien, 1998; SSA, 1997).  Thus, 
Sayan and Kiraci (2001b) have searched for a time path for the minimum retirement age 
to follow between 1995 and 2060 for a given contribution rate, and for a given range for 
the replacement rate, by defining the objective as to minimize the Turkish pension 
system deficit between 1995 and 2060.  The results obtained in the study indicate that 
retaining the current values of contribution and replacement rates would require a 
substantial one-time increase in the minimum retirement age, but if a gradual increase in 
retirement age is chosen instead, some generations would be able to retire at an earlier 
age than the age implied by scenarios requiring a one-time increase in retirement age. 
The later generations, however, will naturally be required to stay in the workforce 
beyond this age.  
Sayan (1999) analyzed the effects of compliance problem in Turkish pension 
system both on employees and employers who contribute to the system regularly. The 
analysis uses the same optimization framework as described in Sayan and Kiracı (2001a) 
and identifies the possible pension reform parameters for different levels of compliance, 
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i.e., by letting the rate of workers/employers who avoid compulsory contribution 
payments vary within a certain range. A comparison of the resulting parameter 
configurations with those of Sayan and Kiracı (2001a) reveals that for any given pair of 
minimum retirement age and contribution rate, minimizing the deficit of Turkish 
pension system between 1995 and 2060 requires a lower replacement rate as compliance 
rate falls. Alternatively, distributing the surplus resulting from higher compliance 
between employees and employers will increase the welfare of both. 
Boll, Raffelhuschen and Walliser (1994) studied the intergenerational 
redistribution of the burden of the “1992 Parametric Pension Reform Act” enacted in 
Germany. They developed a ratio/index which characterizes a parametric pension 
system reform’s intergenerational stance by utilizing generational accounts instead of 
conventional annual fiscal deficits. This index is constructed by computing the 
generational account of the last generation based on the parameters that are valid before 
the reform, and that of the first generation based on the reform parameters. If the 
growth-adjusted generational account of the last generation computed using the pre-
reform parameters falls short of (exceeds) the generational account of the first 
generation computed using the post-reform parameters, then the intergenerational 
redistribution of the reform is said to benefit the presently living (future) generations. By 
utilizing the ratio of these two accounts, Boll, Raffelhuschen and Walliser (1994) 
concluded that the German Parametric Pension Reform Act of 1992 shifted the burden in 
favor of the generations currently alive, aggravating the situation for future generations. 
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2.2 Political Economy of PAYG-based Pension Schemes 
The need for construction of a positive theory of pension security is widely 
emphasized in the literature: 
Mulligan and Sala-i Martin (1999b) indicated that the evaluation of any reform 
implicitly assumes a positive theory for social security so as to determine whether the 
reform will improve social welfare. Similarly, determining whether reforms are 
sustainable will require a positive theory of the creation and evolution of social security. 
Browning (1975) emphasized the role of majority voting models in the 
construction of a positive theory of political economy, because these models enable 
political economists to determine how political forces influence the actual determination 
of government policy.  
Cremer and Pestiau (2000) indicated that demographic aging or the structure of 
PAYG financing does not threaten the PAYG-based pension schemes, as an adjustment 
of parameters of the system will repair the actuarial balance of the system. They argued 
that the real problem is political: the reforms have to go through a political process and 
that is what makes the implementation of appropriate adjustments of parameters 
impossible. 
Marini and Scaramozzino (1999) indicated that the reluctance to accept the 
reductions in the social security coverage probably rests on the same rationale behind the 
very existence of social security, and suggested that the first step towards the 
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understanding of the issues should be to determine the economic and political forces 
behind public pension schemes. 
There is also a sizeable literature of the studies seeking an answer to what 
economic and political forces create and sustain old age social security as a public 
program.  
Samuelson (1958) showed that in a “consumption loan economy” where there are 
no storage and real investment possibilities, each generation can earn a rate of return 
equal to the rate of population growth (Samuelson’s biological interest rate) by 
contributing to a PAYG-based system.  Disney (1999) indicated that with Samuelson’s 
postulation of  “consumption loan economy,” a fair social contract – PAYG-based 
scheme – between generations exists, where each generation improves upon and is 
symmetrically treated by the scheme.  
Aaron (1966) extended Samuelson’s (1958) study and showed that the 
contributions to the PAYG-based system earn a rate of return equal to the sum of the 
rate, of growth of population and real wages. He concluded that the introduction of a 
PAYG-based pension scheme will improve the welfare position of each person, if the 
sum of rates of growth of population and per capita real wages exceeds the rate of 
interest which is normally supposed to be equal to the marginal rate of return on physical 
capital. This result has been the motivation of other studies that compare the funded and 
unfunded (PAYG-based) schemes. For example, Algoed and Spinnewyn (1999) 
compared the funded schemes and the unfunded schemes in the context of golden rule 
path of capital accumulation.  The golden rule of capital accumulation states that steady-
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state consumption per head is maximized, when the marginal rate of return on capital is 
equal to the economy’s growth rate – the sum of growth rates of population and per 
capita real wages.  Hence, on the golden rule path, the returns of funded and unfunded 
schemes are equal to each other, whereas in dynamically inefficient economies, the rate 
of return on saving in PAYG-based systems is larger than the one in funded systems. If 
the comparison is restricted to Pareto-efficient situations, the rate of return on saving in 
funded schemes is at least as large as the one in PAYG-based schemes. The authors 
emphasized that since the interest rate has always exceeded the growth rate, and thus the 
economists as well as politicians have concluded that the funded scheme is more 
efficient than the PAYG-based scheme. 
Social security is often modeled as a redistribution resulting from the outcome of 
a political battle between groups of citizens or lobbies. One way to analyze the 
establishment and evolution of social security is to analyze the determination of 
contribution and replacement rates by developing a majority-voting model. This 
approach was first taken in the seminal work by Browning (1975). 
Browning (1975) considered a model in which there are three generations – the 
young, the middle-aged and the old – of equal size. Population size does not change over 
time. Only the young and the middle-aged have current incomes that happen to be equal 
to each other and to grow at the rate of 100% per year. Thus, the growth rate of the 
economy is 100% per year. 
The scenario proposed by Browning (1975) is tabulated in Table 1. The 
individuals are designated as A, B, C and so forth. In year zero, B and C have an income 
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of 250, and A, being retired, has no current income. In year 1, a PAYG-based pension 
scheme is introduced with the assumption that the total amount of contributions 
collected in each year is transferred to the retirees. The tax rate imposed is 10 percent 
with taxes of 50 on C and D providing a total transfer of 100 to B. Beginning with D, all 
individuals will earn a return equal to the rate of growth of economy, but the members of 
the older generations, in this case B and C, can receive a higher rate of return from a 
given tax rate than the subsequent generations: B benefits from the pension scheme 
without paying any taxes, and C receives a return of 300 percent on his contributions of 
50 in year 1.Within this framework, it is observed that although the amount of pension 
that a retiree receives depends only on the tax rate used when he is retired, the 
introduction of a PAYG-based scheme (or a change in the tax rate) will imply different 
annual rate of returns for the old and the middle-aged than the young and future 
generations.  
Table 1: Browning’s (1975:374) Model of Majority Voting  
Browning (1975) considered analyzing the determination of the tax rate by 
utilizing majority voting in this simple model: In year 1, a once-and-for-all referendum 
is held to determine the tax rate for the pension scheme with the key assumption that the 
 
Years 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Tax rate  0 .10 .10 .10 .10 
Young C250 D500(-50) E1000(-100) F2000(-200) G4000(-400) 
Middle-aged B250 C500(-50) D1000(-100) E2000(-200) F4000(-400) 
Retired A0 B(+100) C(+200) D(+400) E(+800) 
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tax rate to be introduced will be stationary, i.e., each voter is on the belief that the 
outcome of the vote will not change during his lifetime. It is also been assumed that, at a 
100 percent annual rate of return, each individual will prefer to save 10 percent of his 
working years’ income at the beginning of his working life. Then, each voter (in this 
case B, C and D) will compare the present value of taxes he will pay under alternative 
tax rates to the pensions he will receive, and both this comparison and the voter’s 
preferences on saving will play a role in the determination of the voter’s preferred tax 
rate. D’s preferred tax rate will be 10 percent under given assumptions. B, however, 
would prefer the highest tax rate possible since he will benefit from this change without 
any cost. Then, C’s choice will be crucial. Considering that he receives 300 percent 
return in his tax payments, he will favor a tax rate higher than 10 percent. Then, C will 
be the median voter and his preferred tax rate will be the outcome of majority voting. As 
a result, assuming that the median voter is among the older members of the working 
population, as it is the case in Browning (1975), majority voting will imply a level of 
social security in excess of that which maximizes lifetime welfare; in other words, 
majority voting will imply excess spending comparing to spending chosen by 
individuals at the start of their life cycles. This result is known as the overexpansion of 
the PAYG-based pension system. 
 To sum up, Browning’s (1975) simple majority voting model showed how 
elderly – a minority of the voting population – can be the winners of an election by 
forming a coalition with the middle-aged, and inevitably create excess spending on the 
pension system. Browning’s (1975) majority voting model is also successful in 
explaining why aging threatens the viability of PAYG-based pension schemes, because 
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the tax rate will tend to increase and reach unsustainable levels as the political strength 
of the elderly increases with population aging. What is more important for this study is 
that, for any possible parametric pension system reform, assuming that the median-aged 
voter is among the older members of the working population, Browning’s (1975) 
majority voting model will imply that the elderly can form a coalition with the middle-
aged and force the government to place the burden of reform wholly on the young 
members of the population and the unborn generations. 
Mulligan and Sala-i Martin (1999b) emphasized that some political theories of 
social security like Browning (1975) are built upon explicit game theoretic political 
models, and the amount and the type of redistribution – the outcomes of the model – rely 
highly on the form of the game. Thus, the outcome of the model will change across 
different countries with different political institutions, and different demographic 
structures. Topal (1999) took this fact into consideration within the context of Turkish 
social security system. 
Topal (1999) stated that although the median voter age is increasing in Turkey, it 
is still around 35. Hence, the median voter in Turkey will not be in favor of tax 
increases. It can also be concluded from Turkey’s demographic structure that there does 
not exist any demographic pressure on the viability of the Turkish social security 
system. Moreover, it has also been argued that Turkish government tried to win the 
votes of the median group through generous retirement benefits, like exceptionally low 
retirement ages by international standards. That is one of the answers to why Turkish 
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social security system faces a severe financial crisis despite a relatively young 
population. 
2.3 Generational Policy Studies and Generational Accounting 
The generational stance of a fiscal policy can be described as the policy’s 
treatment of different generations regarding the distribution of resources, and the 
allocation of the cost of the policy among the generations. Generational policy studies 
analyze the generational stance of fiscal policies and try to develop policies that sustain 
the balance between the economic well-beings of the old, the young and the unborn 
generations relative to the policy. Hence, generational policy studies require an objective 
measure of the economic well-beings of different generations in order to analyze the 
generational stance of a fiscal policy correctly. 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff  [hereafter: AGK] (1991a) argued that the 
annual cash flows traditionally used as a measure to evaluate fiscal policies do not 
capture the generational stance of a fiscal policy. That’s because policies that 
dramatically alter the intergenerational distribution of fiscal burdens may do so without 
inducing any change in the size of annual deficit. Thus, they suggested generational 
accounts as an alternative way of measuring fiscal policy. Generational accounts are 
defined as the present value of net taxes (taxes paid minus transfer payments received) 
that individuals of different age cohorts (generations) are expected to pay under current 
policy over their remaining lifetimes. The authors proposed a basic approach to calculate 
generational accounts and simulated the use of generational accounting for some 
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hypothetical policies, as well as for the calculation of lifetime net tax rates for some 
generations in the United States. 
  AGK (1991b) used generational accounting framework to analyze potential 
changes in the federal government’s pension system and the Medicare program in the 
U.S. They examined several social security and Medicare policies which may be 
adopted over time so as to determine America’s policy path.  They emphasized that 
specifying a different path for payroll taxes or Medicare costs requires the identification 
of the balancing compensation policy for either of these changes in order to preserve 
intertemporal fiscal balance.  The study showed that the use of generational accounting 
reveals the relative burdens that these different policies place on different generations, 
whereas deficit accounting can not do that. 
After AGK suggested using generational accounts, a large number of countries 
around the world started to use generational accounts. Ablett (1996), Hagemann and 
John (1997), Gokhale, Page and Sturrock (1997), Kotlikoff and Raffelhuschen (1999), 
Takayama and Kitamura (1999) reported the latest generational accounting results for 
different countries.2 Kotlikoff and Raffelhuschen (1999) have identified four major 
advantages of generational accounting over deficit accounting: it is forward looking; it is 
comprehensive; it poses and answers economic questions, and its answers are invariant 
to the economically arbitrary choice of fiscal vocabulary.  Generational accounting 
simulations for different countries revealed a significant intergenerational imbalance 
detrimental to future generations. Thus, considering the growing size of spending on 
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elderly, these studies suggested that the conventional deficit measures should effectively 
be replaced by generational accounts. On the other hand, generational accounts have 
been criticized for their sensitivity to the interest rate chosen to discount future 
government taxes and transfers (Haveman, 1994). Nevertheless, generational accounts 
are a useful tool of analyzing fiscal policy and they bring clear messages about the need 
for policy adjustments.  
Gokhale (1998) argued that intergenerational equity has also significant 
implications for fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency, because in the presence of 
a huge imbalance in generational policy to hurt future generations, future generations 
might not bear the burden of the fiscal policy, making the policy unsustainable. The 
author also addressed the question of what fiscal measures are required to achieve 
prospective generational equity and long-term sustainability in the entire government 
budget and proposed some policy alternatives in this manner.  The study has also shown 
that waiting even a few years to implement policies that establish prospective 
generational equity and long-term sustainability will increase the burden on the future 
generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
2 The countries examined in these studies are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.   
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
AN INTERGENERATIONAL OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF 
PARAMETRIC PENSION REFORM ALTERNATIVES FOR 
TURKEY 
 
 
3.1 Basic Definitions: 
Basic conceptual framework of the study is explained in this section. The first 
subsection begins with the characterization of pension systems operating on a PAYG 
basis on the basis of the underlying accounting identity of PAYG financing, and 
continues with the explanation of the effects of demographic and economic changes on 
expenditure-revenue balances of such pension systems. This subsection also discusses 
pension system reform alternatives. In Section 3.1.2, the structure of Turkish social 
security system is described, and the reasons behind the financial crisis of the system 
leading to the 1999 pension reform act are briefly discussed. Finally, Section 3.1.3 
discusses the measurement of the generational stance of a fiscal policy and explains the 
use of generational accounting framework in capturing the generational implications of a 
fiscal policy. 
 
3.1.1 Pay-As-You-Go Based Pension Schemes 
A pension system which is run by a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme uses 
contributions of currently active workers to finance pension benefits to eligible retirees 
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who have previously contributed to the system. Thus, for a PAYG-based pension system 
to be in actuarial balance3 over a given period of time, the amount of contributions has to 
be equal to the amount of pension payments. This equilibrium state of the PAYG 
scheme can be represented by the underlying accounting identity of the scheme as 
follows: 
RttNttt ⋅=⋅⋅ ρωτ                  (1) 
In this identity, τt represents the average contribution rate at time t, and defines 
the percentage of a worker’s income that is contributed to the scheme on the average. It 
is a combined rate including the contribution of the employer. tω  represents the average 
wage earnings of each contributing worker, so the product τt * tω  represents the average 
contribution to the scheme per worker. The multiplication of average contribution with 
Nt, the number of workers contributing to the system at time t, results in the total amount 
of contribution to the scheme. In other words, the left hand side of the identity represents 
the total revenue of the pension system at time t. On the right hand side of the identity, 
tρ  represents the average level of pension income by each retiree and Rt stands for the 
number of retirees covered by the system at time t. So, tρ  * Rt represents the total 
amount of pension payments obtained by retirees at time t. 
This identity can be written in a more appealing way, facilitating a clear 
understanding of the underlying dynamics of a PAYG-based pension scheme as follows: 
                                                 
3 Actuarial balance means that the system is in payment-revenue balance. 
 22
t
t
t
t
t N
R⋅= ω
ρτ                          (1') 
t
t
ω
ρ
, the ratio of average level of old-age pension to average wage is called the 
average replacement rate. This is the rate at which wages are replaced by pensions after 
retirement. Hence, replacement rate can be viewed as an index of the relative standard of 
living of retirees. The second term on the right hand side, 
t
t
N
R
, shows the ratio of 
number of retirees covered by the system to number of contributing workers at time t, 
and is called the dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is what makes the actuarial 
balance of a PAYG-based pension sensitive to demographic developments and changes 
in labor market conditions. In a publicly managed pension system where coverage is 
compulsory, policy makers of the system can control this ratio by setting minimum 
retirement ages and minimum contribution periods.  
The accounting identity in (1') shows three important characteristics of the 
scheme. Firstly, a PAYG-based pension scheme is defined by three parameters that can 
be set by policy makers: the contribution rate, the replacement rate and retirement age 
and/or minimum contribution periods that control the dependency ratio. Secondly, the 
identity reveals that the product of the replacement rate and the dependency ratio must 
equal the contribution rate for the system to maintain actuarial balance. Thirdly, PAYG 
financing calls for intergenerational solidarity as a precondition of sustainability of the 
scheme as the pensions paid to retirees –the older generations in the population– are paid 
out of the contributions of active workers –the younger generations in the population. In 
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other words, a PAYG-based pension scheme can maintain the actuarial balance so long 
as there is a sufficient number of contributors. 
Another important property that characterizes a PAYG-based pension scheme is 
the rate of return that a worker receives on his/her contributions to the scheme out of 
which the pensions are paid. As first pointed out by Samuelson (1958) and then by 
Aaron (1966), each generation can earn a rate of return equal to the sum of the growth 
rates of population and real wages by contributing to a PAYG-based pension scheme. 
This property of PAYG-based schemes is simulated in Box 3.1 by utilizing the 
accounting identity of the scheme. Letting the rate of growth of population be n, and the 
rate of growth of real wages be g, and assuming that all active workers in period t-1 
manage to survive and receive pension payments in period t, i.e., Rt=Nt-1 for all t, the 
dependency ratio now equals 


+ n1
1
. Similarly, average wages at time t, tω , can be 
expressed in terms of 1−tω , average wages at time t-1, by (1+g) 1−tω .  
Box 3.1: Rate of return of a PAYG-based pension scheme 
 
 
 
n
R
N
t
t += 1   and   g
t
t +=
−
1
1ω
ω
 
 
 (1)     1)1()1( −⋅⋅+⋅+=⇒ ttt gn ωτρ    (2) 
 
  and       1)1( −⋅⋅++≈ ttt gn ωτρ  (2') 
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Equation (2') implies that the rate of return of a PAYG-based scheme is totally 
determined by the rate of growth of population and the rate of growth of real wages. 
This, in turn, implies that productivity changes and demographic changes play the same 
role in the determination of the rate of return of a PAYG-based pension scheme. Hence, 
a natural question that arises now is how demographic changes and productivity changes 
will affect a PAYG-based scheme. It is clear that a decrease in the rate of growth of real 
wages (which may be due to a productivity slowdown) and a decrease in the rate of 
growth of population (which may be due to a decrease in the birth rate and/or an 
increase in life expectancy) decrease the rate of return in PAYG-based schemes. Hence, 
these changes decrease the popularity of the scheme. Furthermore, a steady decline 
either in the growth rate of real wages or in the growth rate of population will shed  
serious doubt on the sustainability of these pension schemes. This observation is 
described in greater detail below. 
It is a well-known fact that the world population is currently aging – that is the 
proportion of older people in the population is growing steadily, and though more 
visibly in some countries than others (ILO, 1989; Sayan, 2002). This demographic 
transition process is due to demographic trends of continuously declining birth rates and 
increasing life expectancies. So, the dependency ratios of current PAYG-based pension 
schemes are steadily rising. According to identity (1), a steadily increasing dependency 
ratio implies that either the average replacement rate should steadily decrease or average 
contribution rate should steadily increase or a combination of both should occur in order 
to maintain the actuarial balance. Thus, as a result of population aging, PAYG-based 
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pension schemes will quickly reach unsustainable levels either in benefits or in 
contributions, unless preventive measures are taken.   
As a consequence of the combined effect of rapid aging and the slowdown in 
productivity growth experienced by some major industrialized countries, PAYG-based 
pension schemes already began to face growing deficits, requiring increased amounts of 
Treasury funding to cover these deficits. These events have provoked a heated debate on 
the very future of pension schemes. As a result, pension reforms are planned in some 
countries, or have already been enacted / are currently under way in others (OECD, 1995 
and 2000). 
The reforms aiming to repair the actuarial balance of pension systems, can be 
classified into two groups (Chand and Jaeger, 1996; Legros, 1997): 
• Systemic reforms such as moving towards a funded scheme. 
• Parametric pension system reforms which aim to fix the existing PAYG-
based pension scheme through adjustments in three parameters defining 
the PAYG-based scheme. 
Parametric pension system reforms include any combination of three strategies in 
order to fix up the actuarial balance of the scheme: 
• Increasing contributions by increasing the contribution rate τ 
• Decreasing the generosity of the scheme by decreasing the replacement 
rate ω
ρ  
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• Decreasing the dependency ratio N
R
, by raising the minimum retirement 
or entitlement age at which an individual first becomes eligible for the 
pension. 
An important point here is that for the three parameters that define a PAYG-
based pension scheme, infinitely many configurations can be found to repair the 
actuarial balance of the system in the desired period of time. Although each will 
maintain the balance, they will have different effects for the well-being of working or 
retiree populations (Sayan and Kiracı, 2000). Hence, these effects must be considered 
when enacting a well-planned reform. 
Regarding our study, the important difference between the parameter 
combinations maintaining the balance of the system is their generational implications 
with respect to the distribution of the burden of reform among different generations. For 
example, raising the contribution rate will aggravate the situation for working and future 
generations, while decreasing the replacement rate will make the retired generations 
worse off.  Thus, the generational stance of possible parametric pension system reform 
parameters must be determined.  
Before introducing the concept of generational stance of a fiscal policy, the 
structure and problems of the social security system in Turkey are briefly reviewed. 
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3.1.2 Social Security System in Turkey 
The formation of social security system in Turkey dates more than fifty years 
back. The vision and the scope of the system are stated in Article 60 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Turkey as: “Everyone has the right for social security. The state takes 
the necessary measures to ensure this security and establishes the required 
organizations.” Following this commitment, three major organizations have been 
established by the state to provide social security to all employees in the country.  These 
major organizations are Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu – SSK), 
Government Employees’ Retirement Fund (Emekli Sandığı – ES) and Social Security 
Institution for the self-employed and the independent (BAĞ-KUR). SSK covers 
everyone who is employed by the private sector through a service contract except 
agricultural workers, blue-collar workers employed by the local and central 
governments, and workers contributing to one of the pension funds established by law, 
like the private pension funds that provide social insurance to the staff of some 
commercial banks. ES covers civil servants and BAĞ-KUR covers artisans and other 
self-employed people. These social security organizations provide benefits of disability 
and work injury insurance, sickness insurance, maternity insurance, death grant, 
survivors’ pension and retirement pension. Retirement pension is the major component 
of these benefits and maintained on a pay-as-you-go basis.   
Considering the development of the PAYG-based pension systems throughout 
the world, Turkish pension system started to face financial problems earlier than the 
other countries. It has been argued that the main reason behind the financial difficulties 
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that pension systems in some countries currently experience is the demographic process 
of aging. Although Turkish population also tends to age, Turkey currently has a younger 
workforce/population relative to other countries. So, currently, the demographic 
structure is an advantage rather than a reason for crisis in the Turkish pension system. 
On the other hand, Turkey has created rather unique problems to put its pension system 
in trouble mainly resulting from violations of the fundamental principles of the social 
security. Some of these problems are outlined below: 
One of the major reasons behind the crisis in the Turkish pension system is the 
exceptionally low retirement ages by international standards (Sayan and Kenç, 1999). As 
indicated in Table 2, the retirement age in both developed and developing countries is 
between 55 and 65 while an active female-male worker in Turkey could retire at the age 
of 38-43 after only 14 years of contribution to SSK, and receive 17 years of benefit 
payments on the average (Topal, 1999) prior to the reform of 1999. The proportion of 
retirees who actually retired at an age lower than 50 is around 58% (Ayaş, 1998). 
Table 2: Minimum Retirement Ages Around the World 
 
Retirement Age Country 
Women Men 
Germany 65 65 
Belgium 60 65 
Denmark 67 67 
Portugal 62 65 
Italy 55 60 
Greece 60 65 
China 55 60 
Syria 60 60 
Libya 65 65 
Morocco 60 60 
Tunisia 60 60 
Zaire 60 62 
Source: Ayaş (1998 : 48) 
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Coverage and compliance are also among the important problems of Turkish 
pension scheme. Currently, the social security system in Turkey covers only 76.2% of 
the entire population and only 46.2% of active worker population (Kenar, Teksöz and 
Coşkun, 1996) and the system can collect only 80.7% of all contributions that must be 
collected (Güzel, Okur and Şakar, 1990). Low retirement ages together with the low 
coverage ratio have led to very low dependency ratios, prior to 1999, threatening the 
viability of the system. At the end of 1997, the dependency ratios of SSK, ES and BAĞ-
KUR stood at 2.26, 2.78 and 1.81 respectively. The average dependency ratio for all 
three organizations was 2.26, although it should have been retained around 4 (Ayaş, 
1998). Running a pension system on a PAYG basis is impossible with such a low 
dependency ratio. 
As a result of the features of the system outlined above, the system began to 
generate huge losses starting from the early 1990s, creating a sizeable burden for the 
Treasury as indicated in Table 3.   
Table 3: Growth of Social Security Deficit in Turkey 
 
Year 
  
Share of social security 
deficit in total budget deficit 
Share of total transfers to 
social security institutions in 
GNP (%)  
1993 17  1.20  
1994 20  1.13  
1995 36  1.44  
1996 26  2.16  
1997 34  2.55  
1998 35   2.85   
Source: Ayaş (1998:  48-49) 
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In the absence of any reform of the social security system, the total deficit of social 
security system was projected to increase to 16.8% of GNP by the year 2050 (Ayaş, 
1998) and the required contribution rate in order to maintain the actuarial balance of the 
system was projected to exceed 105% again by 2050 (Gillion and Cichon, 1998). 
As a result, the government was forced to introduce a parametric pension reform 
act in September 1999 so as to eliminate the pension deficits by adjusting the values of 
pension parameters. The major step that the reform took in this direction was a gradual 
increase in entitlement ages through a transition period: entitlement ages were increased 
from 42 to 60 for men, and 38 to 58 for women while the average contribution rate 
remained at roughly the same level of 20% as before. The method of determination of 
replacement rate was changed resulting in a lower average replacement rate than the pre-
reform average level of 65%. Furthermore, restructuring the country’s social security 
system under one organization and separating insurance and health services were set 
among the priority goals of this reform. 
However, in response to an appeal by opposition parties in the parliament, The 
Constitutional Court ruled in November 2001 that the way the entitlement ages were 
gradually increased over time violated the Constitution’s fairness criterion and required 
the government to introduce a new scheme to raise the minimum statutory age until May 
2002. In response, on May 23 2002, the government introduced a new scheme that 
brings a more linear increase in the statutory entitlement ages –relative to the scheme 
introduced in 1999– depending on the length of contribution period by workers. 
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3.1.3 Generational Stance of a Fiscal Policy and Generational 
Accounting 
The notion of generational stance of a fiscal policy can easily be understood by 
analyzing the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. This constraint can be 
expressed in a simple equation: A+B=C+D, where A is the present value of sum of 
remaining taxes (net of transfers received) paid by the generations now alive, B is the 
present value of sum of net taxes paid by future generations, C is the present value of the 
sum of current and future purchases of the government and D is the government’s s net 
debt in present value terms. Given (C+D), the choice of who will pay is a zero-sum 
game in which the economic gains of winner generations are equal to economic losses of 
losing generations. In other words, the bills left unpaid by some generations must be 
paid by some other generations. Hence, the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint reveals that an equitable fiscal policy has to distribute the benefits and the 
burden of a fiscal policy on all generations equally. But, in real life, the structure of tax 
and transfer spending policies is oriented towards present time, creating substantial net 
gains to older living citizens, and leaving the bills of these policies to be paid by younger 
and future generations. Taking this fact into consideration, Auerbach, Gokhale and 
Kottlikof (1991a: 84) defined the concept of intergenerational equity as follows: “Future 
generations should not pay a higher share of their lifetime incomes to the government 
than today’s newborns.”  This definition of intergenerational equity implies that the 
burden that a pension reform places on different generations must be identified in order 
to determine the generational stance of the pension reform. 
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The traditional way to measure a fiscal policy is to use annual cash flows like 
annual deficit measures. But, relying on annual terms, a single deficit measure 
completely fails to report the intergenerational distribution of the burden of reform. For 
example, consider a permanent 10 percent increase in the replacement rate which is 
financed by an increase in the contribution rate. Although this reform policy has no 
effect on the annual deficit measures, it has important generational implications: The 
elderly gain substantially from this policy while the young and the future generations 
lose. 
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kottlikof (1991a) proposed generational accounts as an 
alternative way of measuring fiscal policy. Such measurement of fiscal policy relies on 
intertemporal rather than annual terms, successfully reporting the generational 
implications of a fiscal policy. A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values 
and defined as follows:  
( )∑ +⋅⋅= +
=
−Lk
kts
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kskskt rPTN
),max(
,,, 1                       (3) 
In equation (3), Nt,k represents the account of generation born in year k, 
calculated at time t, and s runs from zero to L, where L is the life expectancy of the 
generation. Ts,k represents the projected average net tax payments by a member of 
generation born in year k to government in year s. Ps,k stands for the number of surviving 
members of generation born in year k at time s and r is the discount rate. 
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In other words, generational accounts report for every generation alive, the 
remaining net payments to the intertemporal budget constraint under current policy. So, 
adding up the generational accounts of all generations now alive gives the total 
contribution of these generations towards paying the government’s bills, corresponding 
to A in the intertemporal budget constraint. Similarly, the sum of generational accounts 
of all future generations results in B in the budget constraint. Thus, we can now write the 
intertemporal budget constraint in terms of generational accounts: 
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In equation (4), Gs represents the government expenditure in year s and these 
values are discounted to year t by discount rate r. The remaining term on the right hand 
side, Dt, represents the government’s net debt in year t.  As all expenditures and 
revenues are in present value terms, this approach catches the zero-sum nature of 
intertemporal budget constraint. That’s why generational accounts are successful in 
reporting the generational implications of a fiscal policy. 
3.2 Generational Stance of a Parametric Pension System Reform 
Any pension reform’s generational stance, reform’s relative treatment of 
generations regarding the distribution of burden of reform, is determined through a 
political process. Browning’s (1975) seminal paper will be useful in understanding this 
political process.  Assuming that the median-aged voter is among the older members of 
the working population, Browning’s (1975) majority voting model will imply that the 
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elderly can form a coalition with the middle-aged and force the government to place the 
burden of reform wholly on the young members of the population and the unborn 
generations. Considering the increasing political strength of the elderly due to 
population aging and the present-oriented behavior of the governments that are 
concerned with short-term electoral outcomes, this will be a very realistic scenario. 
Hence, in any parametric pension system reform, some generations may be chosen by 
the policy makers to continue to face the parameters which are valid before the 
enactment of reform (hereafter: pre-reform parameters) through the rest of their lives, 
depending on the characteristics of political institutions of the country like labor unions, 
lobbies and the government, and the demographic structure of the country. So, the 
reform will not introduce any decrease in the economic well-beings of these generations 
while placing the burden of maintaining the long-term actuarial balances of the scheme 
wholly on the generations that will face the parameters introduced by reform  (hereafter: 
post-reform parameters). Hence, the policy makers’ choice of the generations that will 
face the pre-reform parameters and the generations that will face the post-reform 
parameters will be an important factor in the determination of the generational stance of 
a pension reform. Furthermore, all the configurations of post-reform parameters that are 
compatible with the maintenance of long-term actuarial balance of the scheme will 
imply different levels of economic well-beings for the generations that will face post-
reform parameters. So, the policy makers’ choice of the configuration of post-reform 
parameters will be another important factor in the determination of generational stance 
of a parametric pension system reform. Hence, the achievement of an equitable pension 
reform policy requires identification of the configuration of reform parameters which 
will minimize the deterioration in the economic well-beings of the generations that will 
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face post-reform parameters, relative to the economic well-being of generations that 
faced/will continue to face the pre-reform parameters.  
It has been emphasized that the analysis of generational stance of a fiscal policy 
requires the determination of the economic well-beings of different generations under 
the policy. Thus, the analysis of generational stance of a parametric pension system 
reform requires the development/identification of a measure that objectively indicates 
which generation gets what from the pension system both in the present system and 
under proposed changes. 
Generational accounts may be utilized as a measure of the generational stance of 
a parametric pension system reform, but a lower net contribution to the pension scheme 
(present value of contributions to the scheme – present value of retirement pensions 
received from the scheme) may not always imply a higher rate of return. On the other 
hand, the ratio of present value of retirement pensions received from the scheme to the 
present value of contributions to the scheme, (or the money worth ratio4 as it is 
sometimes called in the literature) will be an appropriate measure of what a worker 
receives on his/her contributions to the scheme regardless of the size of the contribution. 
If the ratio is greater than one, then workers receive more than their money’s worth from 
the pension scheme, but if the ratio is less than one, then workers receive a bad deal 
from the scheme failing to get their money’s worth. Hence, in this study, the economic 
well-being of a generation under a pension reform policy is measured with the return 
                                                 
4 Money worth ratio is also referred to as benefit/cost ratio. See Leimer (1996) for an excellent summary 
of the measures that are frequently used in the literature. 
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(money’s worth) that cohorts receive on their contributions to the scheme. Relying on 
intertemporal settings as generational accounts do, money worth ratio (hereafter: MWR) 
is also successful in reporting the generational implications of different policies of 
reform. In other words, the comparison of MWR of an appropriate generation that is 
chosen to represent the generations facing the pre-reform parameters, and the MWR of 
an appropriate generation that is chosen to represent the generations facing the post-
reform parameters will reveal the generational stance of a parametric pension system 
reform.5 
An illustration of this comparison may be useful at this point. The following 
scenario will be utilized for illustration: Assume that the 1999 parametric pension 
reform act in Turkey did not cover the generations who are eligible for joining the 
workforce at the point of time that the reform was enacted. In such a case, all of these 
generations would have been dependent on the pre-reform parameters. Given that the 
lower age limit to join the workforce is 15 in Turkey, everybody who was 15 years old 
or older at the point of time the reform was enacted would have been dependent on the 
pre-reform parameters. If we assume that such a reform does not allow for a gradual 
transition period, everybody who is 14 years old or less when the reform is enacted 
including the future generations will be dependent on the post-reform parameters.  Now, 
the generation of 15-years olds in 1999 can be picked to represent the generations facing 
pre-reform parameters, and the generation of 14-years olds in 1999 can be picked to 
represent the generations facing post-reform parameters, because the entire working 
                                                 
5 The comparison of generational accounts of current newborns and the growth-adjusted accounts of future 
newborns is widely utilized in the literature as a measure of generational stance of a fiscal policy (see, for 
example Boll et al., 1994).  
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phase and retirement phase of the life cycles of both generations lie in the future after 
the reform. Thus, the effects of parametric reform on both the working phase and the 
retirement phase of the life cycle can be captured precisely.  
If the MWR of the generation who is 15 years old in 1999 is larger (smaller) than 
the MWR of the generation who is aged 14 in 1999, it is concluded that the reform 
redistributes the burden to the detriment (benefit) of the generations that are dependent 
on the post-reform parameters. This comparison may be represented by the ratio 
1984,1999
1985,1999
MWR
MWR=Ψ , where MWR1999,1985 represents the money worth ratio of the 
generation who was born in 1985 ( to be 14 years old in 1999), calculated in year 1999, 
and MWR1999,1984 represents the money worth ratio of the generation who was born in 
1984 (to be 15 years old at 1999), calculated again in year 1999. A ψ of unity will reveal 
that policy makers’ choice of post-reform parameters provides the same level of 
economic well-being for the generations that will face post-reform parameters as the 
level of economic well-being of the generations that faced pre-reform parameters.  
On the other hand, a primary aim of a parametric pension reform is to fix the 
actuarial balance of a pension system whose sustainability is seriously threatened by 
growing deficits. If we take into consideration the myopic behavior of governments that 
are concerned with short-term electoral outcomes rather than the well-being of future 
generations, it will not be wrong to expect that the reform will be postponed repetitively 
until the system cannot be sustained by large reductions in the generosity of the pension 
system, especially for the future generations. Hence, it can be concluded that the MWR 
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of the generations who are dependent on post-reform parameters will probably be 
smaller than the MWR of the generations that are dependent on pre-reform parameters. 
Under these circumstances, any reform alternative will probably have a ratio of ψ which 
is smaller than 1.  
This ratio ψ will be utilized as the mathematical measure of the generational 
stance of a parametric pension system reform in the following section. 
3.3 The Numerical Optimization Framework 
The configurations of three post-reform parameters that will minimize the 
difference between economic well-beings of generations facing pre-reform and post-
reform parameters, while maintaining the actuarial balance of the system in a desired 
period of time can be identified by solving the following minimization problem6, subject 
to the values that exogenous variables are projected to take over time and non-negativity 
constraints:  
0
..
1min
111 ,,
=
−Ψ≡
D
ts
z
ARRCR
                          (5)
  
where 
CR1 = average post-reform contribution rate for employee and employer 
contributions combined,  
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for the exact mathematical statement of the optimization problem. 
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RR1 = average post-reform replacement rate, 
A1 = post-reform minimum retirement age, 
Ψ = the measure of generational stance of pension reform, 
D = deficit of the pension system in the model horizon under the post-reform 
parameters.  
In this optimization model, the objective function is developed so as to solve for 
the post-reform values of the average replacement rate, average contribution rate and 
minimum retirement age to make ψ, the measure of generational stance of a parametric 
pension system reform, as close to 1 as possible, while eliminating the pension deficits 
(resulting in a total deficit of 0 at the end of the model horizon). The exact mathematical 
statement of the objective function is given below for the scenario described in section 
3.2 –that is the scenario in which the generations dependent on the pre-reform 
parameters are represented by the generation who is 15 years old in 1999 and the 
generations dependent on the post-reform parameters are represented by the generation 
who is 14 years old in 1999: 
1−Ψ≡z               (6) 
  1
1984,1999
1985,1999 −≡
MWR
MWR              (6') 
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where 
CR0 = average pre-reform rate for employee and employer contributions 
combined,  
RR0 = average pre-reform replacement rate,  
A0 = pre-reform minimum retirement age,  
d = discount rate, 
t = time index running from initial period, t0, to τ, the end of model horizon, 
a = age index running from the beginning of working life, a0, to L, life 
expectancy in years,  
RA(a,t) : number of retirees at the age of a at time t  (RA(a,t) series is generated 
from the initial projection data by transferring the retirees who are members of 
post-reform generations under the assumptions of the scenario and are younger 
than A to the working population), 
WA(a,t) : number of workers at the age of a at time t  (WA(a,t) series is generated 
from the initial projection data by transferring the retirees who are members of 
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post-reform generations under the assumptions of the scenario and are younger 
than A to the working population), 
WW(a,t) = average real wage earned by workers at the age of a at time t, 
RW(a,t) = average real work time income of pensioners aged a at time t. 
Given this notation, the money worth ratio of the generation representing the 
generations who are dependent on the post-reform (pre-reform) parameters, MWR1999,1985 
(MWR1999,1984) is calculated as follows. This generation becomes eligible to receive 
pension payments when they are aged A1 (A0) in year A1+1985 (A0+1984) and continue 
to receive pensions till year 1985+L (1984+L). At any year a +1985 (a+ 1984) where 
a≥A1 (a≥A0), the total pension payments of this group is calculated by multiplying the 
number of retirees aged a in year a+1985 (a+1984) with the applicable pension for that 
group. The applicable pension for that group is calculated by multiplying the post-
reform (pre-reform) average replacement rate with the average real work time income of 
the pensioners aged a at time a+1985 (a+1984). Then, these yearly total pensions 
received by this group at year a +1985 (a+1984) are discounted to the reform year, 1999, 
by multiplying the yearly total pension with the applicable discount factor, which is 
given by ( ) 141
1
−+ ad ( ) 







+ −151
1
ad where 14 (15) is this generation’s age in year 1999. 
Summing these discounted values over a where a is in [A1,L] ([A2,L]) results in the 
present value of the total pensions received by this generation. Calculation of the present 
value of total contributions paid to the pension scheme by this generation is similar. So, 
the ratio of the present value (calculated in the reform year, 1999) of total pensions 
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received to the present value of total contributions paid by this generation results in 
MWR1999,1985 (MWR1999,1984). 
The exact mathematical statement of the deficit of the pension system in the 
model horizon under the post-reform parameters is given below again for the scenario 
described in 3.2: 
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For any year t where t is in [A1+1985,τ], yearly total pensions received by the 
generations that are dependent on the post-reform parameters are calculated by 
multiplying the number of retirees in each applicable age group a with the applicable 
pension for that group. For example, assume that the post-reform minimum retirement 
age is 38. Then, in year 2025, the generations aged 38, 39 and 40 will be the generations 
that are eligible to receive pensions under the post-reform parameters. This is because 
the generations who are 14 years old in 1999, the younger and the future generations are 
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members of these generations. On the other hand, in year 2025, the generation who is 
aged 41 and all older generations will face pre-reform parameters, as the generation who 
is aged 15 years old in year 1999 and all older generations will be dependent on the pre-
reform parameters with respect to the scenario. Summing the discounted yearly total 
pension payments of these generations over t results in the present value of total 
pensions received by these generations. On the other hand, an active worker belonging 
to the generations that are dependent on the post-reform parameters is paid WW(a,t), and 
contributions are collected at the rate of CR1 out of this income. Similarly, summing the 
discounted values of yearly total contributions of the generations dependent on the post-
reform parameters over t will result in the present value of the total contributions paid to 
the system by these generations. The calculations for the present value of total pensions 
received and the present value of total contributions paid to the system by the 
generations dependent on the pre-reform parameters are similar.  
3.4       Implementation 
Within the framework outlined in Section 3.3, our problem can more precisely be 
formulated as finding the value of 3x1 policy parameter vector [CR1,RR1,A1] so as to 
minimize the difference between economic well-beings of generations facing pre-reform 
and post-reform parameters, while maintaining the actuarial balance of the system, for 
given data on d, CR0, RR0, A0 and exogenous projection data on working and retiree 
populations and real wages. 
This problem is analyzed under two scenarios differentiated by the policy 
makers’ choice of the generations that will continue to face pre-reform parameters and 
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the generations that will face post-reform parameters: The first one is outlined in Section 
3.2 (hereafter: reform scenario 1). The second scenario assumes that the reform enacted 
in 1999 in Turkey does not cover the generations who are eligible to retire in year 1999 
with respect to the pre-reform parameters. Assuming that the reform does not allow for a  
transition process for minimum retirement age to be increased gradually, the generation 
who is 37 years old in 1999 and all the younger and future generations will be dependent 
on the post-reform parameters and the generation who is 38 years old in 1999, and all 
the older generations will be dependent on the pre-reform parameters (hereafter: reform 
scenario 2). The generation who is 38 years old in 1999 is picked to represent the 
generations facing pre-reform parameters, and the generation who is 37 years old in 
1999 is picked to represent the generations facing post-reform parameters.  
In implementing the algorithm developed for this purpose, this study considers 
SSK, the largest of the three publicly managed pension funds in Turkey. This pension 
fund was set to have D=0 over the 1995-2060 period. Hence, the model is utilized in 
order to find the values of post-reform parameters for SSK under the assumptions of the 
two scenarios described above. The projection data needed for this purpose comes from 
several resources. For population and real wage projections, the same data were used as 
in Sayan and Kiracı (1999a). The population projections originally came from ILO 
(1996) study, but Sayan and Kiracı (1999a) have generated a new series under 
appropriate assumptions. These assumptions are similar to those of ILO (1996) about the 
demographic structure of Turkey and are formulated in order to capture the following 
economic and demographic developments between 1995-2060 (Sayan, 1999: 44-45): 
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• The expected decline in the birth rate in Turkey, 
• The expected increase in the life expectancy,  
• Population aging due to the demographic trends given above, 
• Expected developments in the unemployment rates, 
• Expected developments in coverage level. 
The real wage projections originally came from Bulutay (1992). Sayan and 
Kiracı (1999a) have extended the series in this study into 2060 utilizing the assumed 
rates of productivity growth and expected inflation.  Finally, d was taken to be 0.05 as in 
ILO (1996) study. 
The following procedure was used in order to identify the optimal values of the 
post-reform system parameters: For each integer value of A1 between 38 and 65, the 
RA(a,t) and the WA(a,t) series are generated from the initial projection data by 
transferring the retirees who are members of the generations that face post-reform 
parameters and are younger than A1 to the working population under the assumptions of 
the scenario. Then, for each alternative value of the post-reform minimum retirement 
age the optimal values of CR1 and RR1 are found within the interval [0,1] by feeding the 
generated series RA(a,t) and WA(a,t) in the optimization model.  
 Numerical results for both reform scenarios are presented in the following 
section. 
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3.5 Results 
Under the assumptions of reform scenario 1, prior to reform year 1999, all 
presently alive generations that are covered by the scheme (either as an active worker or 
as a retiree) will continue to face the pre-reform parameters after the reform and the 
burden of reform policy is left to be borne by the future generations (the generations 
who are younger than 15, the minimum age to be eligible to join the workforce in 
Turkey and the unborn generations).   
It has been argued that the main reason behind the severe financial crisis of 
Turkey’s PAYG-based pension scheme is the exceptionally low retirement ages that led 
to an unsustainable imbalance between the number of years of contribution and the 
number of years of benefit payments. So, under the assumptions of reform scenario 1, all 
presently covered generations (prior to 1999) will continue to receive the generous 
retirement benefits associated with the early retirement. The generosity of retirement 
benefits is reflected in MWR1999,1984 , money worth ratio of the generation that represents 
the generations facing pre-reform parameters, which is calculated to be 4.718. Taking 
into consideration that MWR focuses only on the pension balances and overlooks other 
benefits provided by the scheme like health care payments, MWR1999,1984 reveals that the 
presently covered generations (and past retirees) will continue to receive (have received) 
substantial benefits in excess of the taxes they have paid.   So, reform scenario 1 also 
places the burden of the substantial benefits that the presently covered generations will 
continue to receive after the enactment of reform  (from 1999 onwards), as well as the 
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burden of funding the deficits of scheme through 1995-1998 periods7 on the future 
generations. Hence, reform scenario 1 is one of the ideal scenarios for a present oriented 
government that is concerned with the electoral outcomes rather than the economic well-
beings of future generations.  
The optimal configurations [CR1,RR1] that are calculated under the assumptions 
of reform scenario 1 are documented in Table 4 for each possible post-reform minimum 
retirement age considered. Each configuration [CR1,RR1] implies the closest money’s 
worth  to MWR1999,1984 possible at the minimum retirement age A1 while eliminating the 
pension deficits and resulting in a total deficit of 0 over the 1995-2060 period. 
MWR1999,1985, the money worth ratio of the generation that represents the post-reform 
generations, the value of the objective function, z, and Ψ, the measure of generational 
stance of reform policy are also tabulated in order to have a clear understanding of the 
relative economic well-being of  the generations facing post-reform parameters.  
Table 4: Numerical Results for Reform Scenario 1 
A1 CR1 RR1 MWR1999,1985 z Ψ  
38 1 0,233 0,153 0,9670 0,0324 
39 1 0,248 0,162 0,9660 0,0343 
40 1 0,263 0,1700 0,9640 0,0360 
41 1 0,285 0,183 0,9610 0,0388 
42 1 0,309 0,196 0,9585 0,0415 
43 1 0,333 0,208 0,9558 0,0441 
44 1 0,358 0,221 0,9531 0,0468 
45 1 0,383 0,234 0,9504 0,0496 
46 1 0,452 0,268 0,9432 0,0568 
47 1 0,528 0,304 0,9356 0,0644 
48 1 0,611 0,342 0,9276 0,0725 
49 1 0,703 0,382 0,9190 0,0810 
50 1 0,806 0,426 0,9097 0,0903 
51 1 0,944 0,482 0,8977 0,1022 
                                                 
7 See Table 3. 
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Table 4 (cont’d): 
52 0,966 1 0,512 0,8914 0,1085 
53 0,916 1 0,524 0,8890 0,1111 
54 0,869 1 0,535 0,8866 0,1134 
55 0,825 1 0,546 0,8843 0,1157 
56 0,783 1 0,557 0,8820 0,1181 
57 0,744 1 0,567 0,8798 0,1202 
58 0,708 1 0,577 0,8777 0,1223 
59 0,675 1 0,532 0,8871 0,1128 
60 0,644 1 0,486 0,8971 0,1030 
61 0,619 1 0,442 0,9062 0,0937 
62 0,596 1 0,397 0,9158 0,0841 
63 0,575 1 0,351 0,9257 0,0744 
64 0,555 1 0,302 0,9359 0,0640 
65 0,538 1 0,253 0,9460 0,0536 
At the first glance, the values of CR1 and RR1 reveal that it is not possible to find 
a feasible configuration [CR1,RR1] as the values of CR1 are too high making it 
impossible for both the employee and the employer to pay contributions, while the 
values of RR1 for lower minimum retirement ages are too low undermining the life 
standards of future retirees radically.  Even at the optimal (minimum) value of the 
objective function which is obtained at the minimum retirement age of 58 when CR1 
equals 0.708 and RR1 equals 1, MWR1999,1985 is calculated to be 0.577. Then, for reform 
scenario 1, the optimal value of Ψ will be equal to 0.1223 and will indicate the sharp 
decrease in the economic well-beings of generations that will face post-reform 
parameters relative to the economic well-beings of the generations that faced/will face 
pre-reform parameters. The infeasibility of the optimal configurations reveals the 
impossibility of maintaining the actuarial balance of the scheme in the model horizon by 
placing the burden of reform only on the future generations. Hence, in a possible 
parametric pension system reform in Turkey, some of the presently covered generations 
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must inevitably share the burden of maintaining the actuarial balance of the scheme 
through 2060. 
Although it is not possible to find any feasible configurations of system 
parameters under reform scenario 1, the results obtained have important implications: 
Firstly, the contribution rates tend to decrease and the replacement rates tend to increase 
as the minimum retirement age increases. This shows that the model tries to balance the 
disadvantageous effects of prolonged working period due to higher minimum retirement 
ages with the advantageous effects of the increased replacement rates and decreased 
contribution rates. Furthermore, for the values of minimum retirement age that are 
greater than or equal to 49, the values of post-reform average replacement rate, RR1, are 
greater than their pre-reform level of 0.65 and the model assigns the maximum possible 
value of 1 to RR1 when A1 is greater than 51. For these values of post-reform minimum 
retirement ages, it can be observed that the infeasibility of the configurations results 
from the high values of CR1.  This observation implies that even a radical extension in 
the working period can not compensate the burden of generous retirement benefits that 
presently covered generations will continue to receive in excess of the taxes they pay 
under reform scenario 1. 
Reform scenario 2 adds the generations that are presently covered by the scheme 
and are not eligible to retire in reform year 1999 to reform scenario 1’s generations 
facing the post-reform parameters. Hence, under the assumptions of reform scenario 2, 
the burden of generous retirement benefits that the generations facing pre-reform 
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parameters will continue to receive decreases as the number of generations that will 
continue to receive these benefits decreases.    
The optimal configurations [CR1,RR1] that are calculated under the assumptions 
of reform scenario 2 are documented in Table 5 for each post-reform value of the 
minimum retirement age considered. Besides z, Ψ and MWR1999,1962, the money worth 
ratio of the generation that represents the generations facing post-reform parameters in 
scenario 2, MWR1999,1985, the money worth ratio of the generation who is 15 years-old in 
year 1999 is also tabulated. Because this generations’ whole working and retirement 
periods of life lie in the future after the reform, MWR1999,1985 catches the effects of 
reform on both working and retirement phases of life cycle.   
Table 5: Numerical Results for Reform Scenario 2 
 
A1 CR1 RR1 MWR1999,1962 z Ψ MWR1999,1984 
38 0,382 0,121 0,916 0,9014 0,0987 0,460 
39 0,381 0,124 0,929 0,8999 0,1001 0,465 
40 0,380 0,128 0,942 0,8985 0,1015 0,475 
41 0,379 0,133 0,961 0,8965 0,1035 0,483 
42 0,378 0,139 0,978 0,8946 0,1053 0,494 
43 0,377 0,145 0,994 0,8930 0,1071 0,504 
44 0,376 0,151 1,008 0,8915 0,1086 0,514 
45 0,375 0,157 1,021 0,8901 0,1100 0,523 
46 0,373 0,175 1,053 0,8866 0,1134 0,549 
47 0,372 0,195 1,084 0,8832 0,1167 0,575 
48 0,358 0,199 1,060 0,8859 0,1142 0,570 
49 0,339 0,194 1,003 0,8920 0,1080 0,549 
50 0,320 0,189 0,947 0,8980 0,1020 0,529 
51 0,300 0,184 0,882 0,9050 0,0950 0,505 
52 0,283 0,179 0,820 0,9116 0,0883 0,478 
53 0,266 0,174 0,761 0,9181 0,0820 0,452 
54 0,252 0,170 0,703 0,9243 0,0757 0,425 
55 0,238 0,165 0,647 0,9304 0,0697 0,394 
56 0,225 0,161 0,589 0,9365 0,0634 0,368 
57 0,296 0,425 1,067 0,8850 0,1149 0,661 
58 0,269 0,399 0,960 0,8966 0,1034 0,606 
59 0,246 0,346 0,855 0,9079 0,0920 0,506 
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Table 5 (cont’d): 
60 0,284 0,633 1,088 0,8828 0,1171 0,698 
61 0,330 1 1,291 0,8610 0,1390 0,830 
62 0,301 1 1,200 0,8710 0,1292 0,787 
63 0,274 1 1,099 0,8820 0,1184 0,735 
64 0,249 1 0,988 0,8940 0,1064 0,674 
65 0,225 1 0,866 0,9070 0,0933 0,604 
The optimal configurations [CR1, RR1] show that it is possible to find feasible 
values of CR1 and RR1 when A1 is greater than 59. But for the values of A1 that are less 
than or equal to 59, the configurations found are still infeasible: The values of RR1 are 
too low implying a radical deterioration in the life standards of the retirees that will face 
post-reform parameters. Also, the values of MWR1999,1985  are higher than the values 
obtained for reform scenario 1 implying the decrease in the burden of reform that is 
placed on future generations. For example, at the optimal (minimum) value of the 
objective function which is obtained at the minimum retirement age of 61 when CR1 
equals 0.33 and RR1 equals 1, MWR1999,1985 is calculated to be 0.830 while the optimal 
(maximum) value of  MWR1999,1985 was 0.577 for the previous scenario. 
The results obtained above imply better economic well-beings for the future 
generations than those obtained for reform scenario 1 and are a natural consequence of 
the distribution of the burden of reform among a greater number of generations with 
respect to the previous scenario. It must be observed, however, that the values of both 
MWR1999,1985 and MWR1999,1962 are still much more less than the pre-reform level of 
4.718 indicating the sharp decrease in the economic well-beings of the generations on 
which the burden of reform is placed.  
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Furthermore, it can be observed that the values of MWR1999,1962 are greater than 
the values of MWR1999,1985. This observation reveals the intergenerational aspects of 
distribution of burden of reform between the generations that face the post-reform 
parameters. Although these generations face the same post-reform parameters, the 
generations that are currently covered by the scheme (prior to year 1999) have already 
contributed to the scheme with the pre-reform level of contribution rate. Hence, for the 
configurations of post-reform parameters those introduce an increase in the contribution 
rate (as it is the case for reform scenario 2), currently covered generations will be 
dependent on the increased contribution rate for a shorter period of time than the future 
generations and will achieve higher money worth ratios from the scheme.  
Our findings for the two reform scenarios are a natural result of the zero-sum 
game nature of the intertemporal budget constraint. Eliminating the deficit that SSK is 
expected to incur over the 1995-2060 period requires the net present value of pension 
transfers to all generations participating the scheme in 1995-2060 period to be equal to 
zero. The results indicate that the early participants of the Turkish pension scheme and 
the generations that will continue to face pre-reform parameters have received/will 
continue to receive substantial positive transfers due to opportunity to retire at retirement 
ages that are exceptionally low by international standards. These generations have 
received/will continue to receive benefits worth well in excess of the value of the 
contributions they paid and achieved MWRs that are as high as 4.  So, any configuration 
of post-reform parameters that aims to repair the actuarial balance of the scheme over 
the 1995-2060 period even the ones that will minimize the difference between economic 
well-beings of generations facing pre-reform and post-reform parameters will imply a 
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MWR that is less than 1 (a negative transfer). A huge part of the contributions of the 
generations that will face post-reform parameters thus can be seen as payments on debt 
incurred to transfer money to retirees that received/will continue to receive substantial 
positive transfers, not as a contribution to finance future pension income.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
AN INTERGENERATIONAL OPTIMIZATION ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMPLIANCE PROBLEM FOR THE PENSION SYSTEM IN 
TURKEY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
In this chapter, we aim to analyze the extra burden that the compliance problem 
places on the employees and the employers who contribute to the system regularly in 
Turkey by utilizing the optimization framework described in the previous chapter. 
Specifically, the optimization model is solved to identify the configurations of pension 
system parameters that will minimize the difference between economic well-beings of 
generations facing pre-reform and post-reform parameters, while maintaining the 
actuarial balance of the system in a desired period of time for different levels of 
compliance. 
Modifications to the optimization model and its implementation are described in 
the following section. Then, the numerical results are presented and briefly discussed in 
the last section of the chapter. 
 
 
 55
4.2 Modifications to the Numerical Optimization Framework and 
the Implementation 
The optimization model (5) has been modified to capture the possible effects of 
changes in compliance rate that will be valid through the end of model horizon on the 
expenditure-revenue balances of the pension scheme and on the objective function. In 
the analysis, it has been assumed that a participant of the scheme who manages to avoid 
compulsory contribution payments can still receive the same amount of benefits as the 
one received by a participant who contributes to the system regularly. Hence, only the 
revenue balances of the pension scheme (amount of contributions collected by the 
scheme) will be affected from a change in the level of compliance. Similarly, in the 
calculation of the MWRs of the representative generations, a change in the level of 
compliance will change the amount of the present value of contributions to the scheme 
while the amount of present value of retirement pensions received from the scheme will 
stay the same. Yet, ψ, the ratio that measures generational stance of a parametric pension 
system reform will not get affected, since the contributions of both pre- and post-reform 
generations will change by the same proportion. To sum up, in the optimization model 
(5), only D, the deficit of the pension system in the model horizon under the post-reform 
parameters will be modified to capture the effects of varying compliance levels. 
The exact mathematical statement of the modified D, the deficit of the pension 
system in the model horizon under the post-reform parameters and under the given level 
of compliance is given below again under the assumptions of reform scenario 1: 
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where 
λ = The leakage rate (as a percentage of the amount of contributions that must 
be collected by the scheme in the case of full compliance).  
Assuming that λ remains the same until the end of the model horizon, only (1-λ) 
times the amount of contributions that are due will be collected by the scheme. It can 
easily be observed here that the optimization model developed in the previous chapter 
assumes full compliance (i.e., a leakage rate of zero). So, the results obtained in the 
previous chapter will be the baseline in the analysis of the extra burden that the 
compliance problem places on the participants that will be dependent on post-reform 
parameters. 
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It has been argued that Turkish pension scheme can collect only 80.7% of all 
contributions that must be collected (Güzel, Okur and Şakar, 1990). Moreover, Sayan 
(1999) pointed out that even by the most conservative estimates, the average leakage 
rate in contributions is around 20%. Hence, the first scenario considered in this chapter 
is the continuation of the current level of leakage (20%), whereas the second scenario 
considers the consequences of reducing the leakage rate 10% through the model horizon. 
As in the previous chapter, the analysis here focuses on SSK and requires that 
D=0 over the 1995-2060 period. The modified model is utilized in order to find the 
values of optimal post-reform parameters for SSK for the two cases defined. Numerical 
results obtained for these cases are presented below: 
4.3 Results 
The optimal configurations [CR1,RR1] calculated for different levels of leakage 
under the assumptions of reform scenario 2 are documented in Table 6 for different post-
reform values of minimum retirement ages. Each configuration [CR1,RR1] minimizes 
the difference between economic well-beings of generations facing pre-reform and post-
reform parameters at the minimum retirement age A1 while eliminating the pension 
deficits and resulting in a total deficit of 0 over the 1995-2060 period.  
Table 6: Numerical Results Obtained Under Different Levels of Compliance 
 
  A1 
  40 45 50 55 60 65 
  CR1 RR1 CR1 RR1 CR1 RR1 CR1 RR1 CR1 RR1 CR1 RR1 
0 0.380 0.128 0.375 0.157 0.320 0.189 0.238 0.165 0.284 0.633 0.225 1 
10 0.397 0.105 0.338 0.128 0.358 0.180 0.266 0.166 0.317 0.634 0.252 1 λ (%) 
20 0.420 0.084 0.409 0.103 0.389 0.171 0.301 0.166 0.358 0.635 0.284 1 
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As the leakage rate decreases the amount of contributions collected increases, 
lowering the burden that the lack of compliance places on employees/employers who 
pay their contributions regularly. This fact is reflected by the optimal configurations 
found. The optimal configurations [CR1, RR1] obtained for each minimum retirement 
age show that post-reform contribution rates decrease and post-reform replacement rates 
increase, as the leakage rate decreases. This implies that the system could improve 
economic well-beings of the generations that will face post-reform parameters, if 
effective measures are taken to increase compliance. For example, when the post-reform 
minimum retirement age is 45 and leakage rate is 20%, the optimal configuration 
[CR1,RR1] is found to be [0.409,0.103] implying a MWR of 0.616, whereas  the optimal 
configuration found under full compliance is [0.375,0.157] implying a MWR of 1.021. 
Furthermore, as the duration of contribution (retirement) period is increased (decreased) 
through higher minimum retirement ages, the replacement rate stays roughly at the same 
level, while the contribution rate is notably decreased by the increase in compliance 
rates. This in turn, implies that it is possible to increase the welfare of both the 
employees and the employers through a distribution of the surplus resulting from 
reductions in contribution rates made possible by rise in compliance rates. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1       Conclusion  
It has been shown in previous literature that there exist infinitely many 
configurations of pension system parameters that are compatible with the maintenance 
of the actuarial balance of a PAYG-based pension scheme over a pre-determined period. 
This study is concerned with the identification of configurations that will strike a 
balance between financial viability of the system and intergenerational fairness effects of 
a parametric pension system reform. For this purpose, we have considered SSK, the 
largest pension fund in Turkey, and developed a simple optimization algorithm to 
identify the configurations of post-reform replacement rate and contribution rate that i) 
will minimize the difference between economic well-beings of generations facing pre-
reform and post-reform parameters, and ii) eliminate, at the same time, the intertemporal 
deficit that SSK is expected to incur over 1995-2060 period for each post-reform value 
of the minimum retirement age considered. The zero-sum game nature of the 
intertemporal deficit implies that any pension reform that aims to eliminate the deficit 
requires that the net present value of pension transfers to all generations participating in 
the scheme during the period under consideration to be equal to zero. Our findings 
indicate that early participants of the Turkish pension scheme and the generations that 
will continue to face pre-reform parameters have received/will continue to receive 
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substantial positive transfers due to the opportunity to retire early. So, any reform 
configuration of post-reform parameters that aims to repair the actuarial balance of the 
Turkish pension scheme over the 1995-2060 period even the ones that will minimize the 
difference between economic well-beings of generations facing pre-reform and post-
reform parameters will imply negative transfers for the generations that will face the 
reform configuration.  
   The same optimization algorithm is also used, after necessary modifications, to 
analyze the effects of the low compliance rates in the Turkish pension system, on both 
employees and employers who contribute to the system regularly. The findings indicate 
that it is possible to increase the welfare of both the employees and the employers by 
distributing the surplus resulting from lower post-reform contribution rates, if 
compliance rates can be increased. 
The present work can be extended in several directions. Firstly, the algorithm can 
be modified to allow for gradual increases in statutory retirement ages rather than one 
time jumps, as it is the case in the present work. In fact, many OECD countries have 
chosen to enact pension reforms with gradual increases in retirement ages so as to avoid 
the political turmoil a one-time jump in retirement ages might cause. Secondly, the 
algorithm can be modified to analyze the effects of coverage problem on the generations 
that will face post-reform parameters for the pension system in Turkey. 
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The GAMS model utilized in the implementation of the optimization model is given below: 
 
SETS 
         a ages /15*80/ 
         ar retirement ages    /38*80/ 
         aw  working ages   /15*75/ 
         t years /1995*2060/; 
 
SCALARS 
 
         d discount rate/0.05/ 
         TotPopAfterReform population of aged 15 at 2000 /1353/ 
         TotPopBeforeReform population of aged 15 at 1999  /1348/ 
         ContributionsOld contributions of the generations dependent on the pre-reform           parameters  
/3898945963439/ 
          BenefitsOld benefits of the generations dependent on the pre-reform parameters /30431941597097/ 
          ContributionsRepresentative Contributions of the generation representing the generations dependent 
on the pre-reform parameters /174413069823/ 
          BenefitsRepresentative Benefitss of the generation representing the generations dependent on the 
pre-reform parameters /822808121776/; 
 
TABLE R(ar,t) 
TABLE RW(ar,t) 
TABLE W(aw,t) 
TABLE WW(aw,t) 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
         CR contribution rate 
         RR replacement rate 
         MWRBeforeReform 
         MWRAfterReform 
         BenefitBeforeReform 
         PaymentBeforeReform 
         BenefitAfterReform 
         PaymentAfterReform 
         SSbenefits 
         SScontributions; 
 
 69
CR.LO = 0; 
CR.UP = 1; 
RR.lo = 0; 
RR.up=1; 
 
VARIABLES 
 
         SSdeficit 
         z; 
 
PaymentBeforeReform.lo = 0.1; 
PaymentAfterReform.lo = 0.1; 
MWRBeforeReform.lo     = 0.0001; 
 
EQUATIONS 
 
         obj                     define objective function 
         EqnBenefitBeforeReform  defines benefits of 1999 newborns 
         EqnPaymentBeforeReform  defines payments of 1999 newborns 
         EqnPaymentAfterReform   defines payments of 2000 newborns 
         EqnBenefitAfterReform   defines benefits of 2000 newborns 
         EqnMWRBeforeReform      defines MWR of 1999 newborns 
         EqnMWRAfterReform       defines MWR of 2000 newborns 
         EqnSSbenefits   'defines transfers from SS through [1995-2060].it is calculated by summing the 
payments made to after reform generations which is calculated optimally and payments made to before 
reform generation s' 
         EqnSScontributions 'defines contributions to SS through [1995-2060]' 
         EqnSSdeficit    'defines SS deficit through period [1995-2060]' 
 
EqnSScontributions..     SScontributions  =e= (sum(t$(ORD(t) GE 6 and ORD(t) LE 
66),(sum(aw$(ORD(aw)+5 LE ORD(t)),POWER(1/(1+d),ord(t)-
5)*CR*W(aw,t)*WW(aw,t))))*1000+ContributionOld)/1E+6; 
 
EqnSSbenefits..             SSbenefits =e= (sum(t$(ORD(t) GE 29 AND ORD(t) LE 66), 
sum(ar$(ORD(ar)+28 LE ORD(t)),POWER(1/(1+d),ord(t)-
5)*RR*R(ar,t)*RW(ar,t)))*1000+BenefitsOld)/1E+6; 
 
EqnSSdeficit..              SSdeficit  =e= (SSbenefits-SScontributions);   
 
 70
 
EqnBenefitBeforeReform..    BenefitBeforeReform=e=BenefitsRepresentative/TotpopBeforeReform; 
 
 
EqnPaymentBeforeReform..    PaymentBeforeReform 
=e=ContributionsRepresentative/TotpopBeforeReform; 
 
 
EqnBenefitAfterReform..     BenefitAfterReform  =e= sum(ar$( ORD(ar) LE 38), sum(t$(ORD(t) EQ 
ORD(ar)),power(1/(1+d),(ord(ar)+23))*RR*R(ar,t+28)*RW(ar,t+28)))/TotpopAfterReform; 
 
 
EqnPaymentAfterReform..     PaymentAfterReform  =e= sum(aw$(ORD(aw) LE 61), sum(t$(ORD(t) 
EQ ORD(aw)),power(1/(1+d),ord(aw))*CR*W(aw,t+5)*WW(aw,t+5)))/TotpopAfterReform; 
 
EqnMWRBeforeReform..        MWRBeforeReform     =e= 
BenefitBeforeReform/PaymentBeforeReform; 
 
 
EqnMWRAfterReform..         MWRAfterReform      =e= BenefitAfterReform/PaymentAfterReform; 
 
obj..                                    z      =e= abs((MWRAfterReform/MWRBeforeReform)-1); 
 
model    equity /all/; 
solve    equity using dnlp minimizing z; 
 
